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Reconciling Human Rights and Sovereignty:
A Framework for Global Property Law
CHRISTOPHER SAPORITA*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the massive destruction and notorious human rights abuses
of World War II, the nations of the world made a widely supported commit-
ment to protecting human rights. Fundamental to this agreement was the
understanding that nation-states, previously viewed as impervious to compul-
sion by extra-national standards of conduct, could not be trusted to protect the
rights of individuals. Also fundamental was the agreement that human rights
belong to all human beings, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, po-
litical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.
In the past fifty years, progress has been made in varying degrees in estab-
lishing consensus on particular issues, monitoring human rights abuses, enforc-
ing human rights, and developing a body of law to guide this task into the
future. While the nations of the world have agreed on some important funda-
mental human rights, disagreement persists as to the full set of human needs and
activities that should be protected as rights. One view holds that civil and politi-
cal rights, typically understood as negative rights reserved by the individual
against state interference, are the primary bulwark against oppression, and that
these rights are sufficient for full realization of equality and prosperity. A con-
trasting view holds that the state's primary duty is to provide affirmatively for
the collective welfare of its citizens. On this view, positive social, economic, and
cultural rights are to be promoted before negative civil and political rights.
Parallel to the enhancement of human rights has been the diminution of
states' rights, or sovereignty. From the Peace at Westphalia forward, a sover-
eign's control of its territory and its final authority to make law within its bor-
ders have been seen as the fundamental building blocks of international law.
1
* J.D., 2003, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 1991, State University of
New York at Stony Brook. I would like to recognize and appreciate the invaluable assistance, guid-
ance, and inspiration provided by Professors Susan Williams and Jost Delbruck. I would also like to
thank my parents, Margaret and Ronald Saporita, for their faith, coaching, and undying support.
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Recently, however, global forces, including markets, communications, and
transportation, have, become more independent of the control of sovereign
states, and a growing number of multilateral agreements with provisions for
extra-national enforcement has, to some extent, deprived states of the "last
word" on a number of issues previously within their domain.2 While most
nations desire the benefits of increasingly integrated "globalized" forces, there
remains serious disagreement regarding the role of sovereign nations in a global
order. One view, espoused by some "globalists," holds that sovereigns are becom-
ing less relevant and less necessary to the extent that wealth (and thus welfare) is
created and distributed by global forces.3 Some globalists go so far as to argue
that sovereignty impedes the true potential of globalization.4 Some skeptics,
however, argue that globalization is merely a cover for imperialism,5 and that
sovereigns are still necessary-perhaps increasingly so-to protect the welfare
of their citizens, and represent their needs against those of disembodied and un-
accountable "global" forces.6 It seems that although sovereign nations retain
great practical and ideological import, when the interests of global forces and
sovereigns come into conflict, the latter are increasingly made to yield.7
A third trend brought to center stage by globalization involves the stature
and extent of property rights in the global era. Traditionally seen as the exclusive
domain of the sovereign, in which states exercise territorial and legislative au-
tonomy, property disputes have become globalized, and the locus of control, at
least in certain areas, has steadily shifted from national to transnational arenas.
The unsettled nature of property rights is central to understanding this trend, as
well as the seemingly intractable disputes regarding the scope of human rights
law and the power of the state. The inability to reconcile these disputes stems, at
least in part, from a fundamental disagreement about the meaning of property,
as well as who should have the final authority to decide how property is pro-
tected and ultimately distributed. Mirroring the divergence in human rights and
2. David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction, in THE
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1, 13 (David
Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READERI.
3. Id.
4. Jost Delbriock, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law---
A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 14 (1993).
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 31.
7. Held & McGrew, supra note 2, at 13.
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sovereignty, the global dispute over property comes down to the dispute between
the liberal ideology that animates free-market capitalism and the socialist ideol-
ogy that animates state-planned economies. The former view holds that in order
to generate industry and wealth, property must be strictly protected against in-
trusion by the state and others. The latter view holds that in order to ensure that
property is equitably distributed, states must retain unencumbered authority to
tailor the levels of protection that property receives. Though there is consider-
able disagreement in this area, there is a general trend toward increasing the
protection of private property as against the state and prioritizing speculative
property over other types.8
This trend in property, more than any other, is at the root of the prioritiza-
tion of individual rights over collective welfare, and the ascendance of global
market forces over sovereign authority. The results are the decreased stature of
and commitment to social, economic, and cultural rights, the diminished capac-
ity of states to protect public welfare within their territories, and a distortion of
civil and political rights.
If we hope to reconcile the divergence in these crucial areas, the global com-
munity must articulate an answer to this fundamental question: How should we
treat property in a global world? In order to do so, we must decide the following:
what is the purpose of property, why or when does it deserve legal protection,
and how can we enforce those protections? Though these questions are
enormous, this note will provide a modest contribution to this dialogue, in the
hope that we will begin to come to terms with the importance of property in
defining-and defending-human rights in a globalized world.
Part I of this note will explore the effects of parallel global trends in human
rights, sovereignty, and property towards individualism, globalization, and
8. See Eduardo Mois~s Pefialver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and
the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 109 (2000) (noting the growing
consensus around liberal markets and property rights); see also Martin Shapiro, The Globalization
of Law, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37,39 (arguing that globalization "through private corporate
lawmaking rather naturally takes the form of the global Americanization of commercial law"); 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (1992) ("It is not surprising to ascertain that
recent international state practice on matters of expropriation to a remarkable degree coincides
with modern rules of national law in liberal states."); see generally J. Martin Wagner, International
Investment, Expropriation, and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 502
(1999) (describing attempts by the U.S. government and multinational investors to use the grow-
ing number of international investment treaties to promote adoption of property protections that
are even stronger than those provided by U.S. law).
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liberalism, respectively. Part II will then address some of the impacts that these
trends are having on social, economic, and cultural rights; on public welfare pro-
tection; and on civil and political rights. Part III will compare and contrast three
alternative theories of property that seek to elevate human needs above specula-
tive interests. Part IV will attempt to articulate a vision of property that recon-
ciles civil/political rights with social/economic/cultural rights in the context of a
continuing role for sovereign states.
I. GLOBAL TRENDS
A. Human Rights
Since the end of World War II, the international community has reached
fundamental agreement on human rights in international law.9 At the founda-
tion of this agreement is the belief that states have an obligation to respect and
protect the rights of their citizens, and that these rights can be enforced by other
states."0 While relatively new, this international consensus has advanced rapidly,
resulting in a host of treaties, resolutions, conventions, and declarations covering
almost every area of human life." The strongest agreements are those relating to
the basic right to life and freedom, manifesting themselves in international pro-
hibitions on torture, slavery, and genocide. 2 While contrary state practices 1" (sla-
very and widespread use of torture) demonstrate that these agreements are often
little more than rhetoric, nearly all states publicly agree with these fundamental
rights.
9. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 886 (1992) ("In national constitutions, and
by international instruments of varying political and legal significance, virtually all States have
embraced the idea of human rights, and have indicated general agreement as to their content.")
[hereinafter 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWI.
10. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RICHTS PRACTICE 3 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984).
11. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPRj; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
12. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
13. Pefialver,supra note 8, at 137.
258
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Despite these fundamental agreements regarding basic human rights, there
remains significant discord about what other needs and interests should be en-
shrined as human rights and protected by international law. Economic, political,
and ideological tensions have thwarted attempts to reconcile the fundamental dif-
ferences between two of the major agreements on human rights: the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)4 and the International Con-
vention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 5 The bifurcated
nature of these conventions, signed at the height of the Cold War (1966), reflects a
deep divide between "positive" rights, favoring greater responsibility and a more
active role for government in promoting economic, social, and cultural rights to
food, housing, health care, education, and employment, and negative rights, cen-
tered on limiting the role of government and protecting civil and political rights
by preventing government from abridging life, liberty, and democracy.
16
Both conventions begin with a commitment to self-determination, non-
discrimination, and gender equality. 7 Beyond that, the ideological differences
become apparent. The ICCPR (ratified by 147 countries, including the United
States and the Soviet Union) focuses on liberty interests, and limits government
responsibility to providing due process when liberty and security are abridged
by state action. By contrast, the ICESCR (ratified by 143 countries, including the
Soviet Union, but not the United States) focuses on human needs beyond liberal
rights, and affirms the state's responsibility to undertake efforts to provide for
these needs. During the drafting process, some governments of socialist states as-
serted a broad power to limit rights where necessary to meet the needs of social-
ism; conversely, some liberal states asserted that the right to work 8 only requires
equal access to work and freedom to choose one's work, and does not create an
affirmative duty by the state to provide work. 9 These positions reflect the differ-
ent ideologies underpinning the power of the state to circumscribe civil/political
rights, and the responsibility of the state to provide social/economic/cultural
rights.
14. ICCPR, supra note 11.
15. ICESCR,supra note 11.
16. Asbjorn Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 15, 17 (Asbj0rn Eide et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS].
17. ICCPR, supra note 11, arts. 1-3; ICESCR, supra note 10, arts. 1-3.
18. ICESCR, supra note 11, art. 6.
19. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 890.
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Though this ideological divide is not evident on the face of the conventions,
it can be seen in the language of each agreement's Article 4, both of which de-
scribe a state's right to derogate from the provisions contained in each conven-
tion.2" Both conventions' Article 4 circumscribe these powers of derogation. In
the ICCPR, Article 4 provides that a state may derogate from its responsibilities
under the convention only "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed."'" In the
ICESCR, the state may limit the rights in the convention "solely for the purpose
of promoting the general welfare." 2 Thus, not only has the United States-the
strongest proponent of civil/political rights-denied an obligation to provide so-
cial/economic/cultural rights, but the language of these treaties also permits
states easily to avoid their obligation to provide social/economic/cultural rights,
by creating a hierarchy of rights that strongly protects civil/political rights. In
addition to the different legal priorities given to the two sets of rights, there are
practical factors that cause social/economic/cultural rights to be inadequately
enforced. Because these rights often take the form of a right to something, a
state's willingness and ability to provide for these rights will require greater po-
litical or legislative will, and more substantial financial commitments.23 By con-
trast, civil/political rights often require the state only to abstain from doing
something.
24
The ultimate implication of this hierarchy of rights is not just that civil/
political rights matter more than social/economic/cultural rights, but that when
the two come into conflict, the former will prevail. This weaker status of the
rights described in the ICESCR has led several authors to conclude that human
rights law is incomplete because it neglects issues of economic rights. As one
author put it, "human rights related to economic justice have been labeled the
'stepchild' of the human rights movement."25
20. ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 4; ICESCR, supra note 11, art. 4.
21. ICCPR, supra note 11, art 4.1.
22. ICESCR, supra note 11, art 4.
23. Asbjrn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, CUL-
TURAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 21, 22-23.
24. Id.
25. Pefialver, supra note 8, at 139.
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B. Sovereignty
In the years since the Peace of Westphalia, sovereignty has been recognized
as the sine qua non of international law, allowing international law to govern the
relationships between sovereign states.26 Article I of the Montevideo Convention
of 1933 provided: "The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c)
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states."27 These
basic elements of a state are echoed and described further in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 201. Among the powers
enjoyed by states are sovereignty, status as a legal person, and the capacity to join
other states in making international law.
28
It is also widely held that all states are equal under law and entitled to self-
determination, and, concomitantly, that other states may not intervene in the in-
ternal affairs of each other 9.2 "Traditional understandings of sovereignty have
ascribed to that concept the characteristics of unlimited freedom and absolute
authority for each state within its own territories."3 To that end, all states may
exercise general police powers and the power of eminent domain. These powers
permit states to pass civil and criminal laws, govern the conduct of their citizens,
determine the allocation of their resources, and define their form of govern-
ment. These broad powers are predicated on the state's role as guardian and rep-
resentative of its nationals' welfare.
The meaning and extent of sovereignty has long been an issue of contention
in international law, and in the era of globalization, the debate has taken on new
dimensions and urgency. This modern debate has been framed as a debate be-
tween globalists, who argue that sovereignty has become less relevant in the face
of globalizing forces,3' and skeptics, who argue that "globalization" is merely an
26. See Anne C. Dowling, "Un-Locke-ing" a "Just Right" Environmental Regime: Overcoming the
Three Bears of International Environmentalism-Sovereignty, Locke, and Compensation, 26 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 891, 894 (2002).
27. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, quoted in
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 462.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
29. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 9, at 512.
30. Dowling, supra note 26.
31. Held & McGrew, supra note 2, at 13.
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ideological front for the "pathological expansionist logic" of capitalism, 32 which
has no concrete reality.3 3 Skeptics argue that sovereignty is, and must remain, ab-
solute.34 This position reflects a deeply local emphasis on the state as the guardian
of its citizens' welfare, and as a combatant in international relations. Under this
model, a state must have the final word on all issues regarding its nationals and its
territories in order to maintain public order and the authority to negotiate from a
position of egoistic self-interest.35 Without this authority, the peoples of smaller,
less powerful states will be without adequate protection and representation.
Globalists, on the other hand, describe a world increasingly subject to dena-
tionalization of political, economic, and social activities, 36 where "the power and
role of the territorial nation-state is in decline."37 For example, today's financial
markets are said to be globalized because the movement of capital has largely be-
come independent of the sovereign control of state agencies, due, in part, to the
telecommunications revolution. " As a result, states suffer a "diminution in
power because the expansion of transnational forces reduces the control individ-
ual governments can exercise over the activities of their citizens and other
peoples."39 Many of the areas in which the state has traditionally maintained re-
sponsibility and authority (defense, economic management, health, and law and
order) now require transnational collaboration."4 Also, as the binding nature of
directives in the European Community demonstrates, "domestic law is set
aside"'" by supranational law that is "independent of the sovereign will of the
Member States and is backed up by the enforcement powers of the ECJ."42
Under the globalist model, states are becoming less and less capable of making
unilateral legal and territorial decisions.43
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Dowling, supra note 26, at 898.
35. Id. at 898-99.
36. Delbriick,supra note 4, at i i.
37. Held & McGrew, supra note 2, at 13.
38. Delbrick, supra note 4, at 10.
39. Held & McGrew, supra note 2, at 13.
40. Id.
41. DelbrUck,supra note 4, at 34.
42. Id.
43. Held & McGrew, supra note 2, at 11.
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C. Property Rights
The divergence in global discourse about human rights and the divergence
about states' rights share a common root. As we have seen, these disagreements
have been framed in terms of liberal/socialist and globalist/statist dichotomies, re-
spectively, and have both been understood as representing the tension between
(theoretically) absolute individual autonomy and (theoretically) absolute state
power. But these dichotomies center around one of the most profound, yet incom-
plete, legal concepts: property. For it is property law that defines the limits of what
the state may control,44 and what an individual may control, and thus what the re-
spective role of each is in attaining a just distribution of wealth and welfare.
Both liberalism and socialism agree with the fundamental legal outlines of a
state's control of property. As noted previously, sovereignty includes a state's
control over its territory, as well as general authority over its nationals.4" Because
states are defined by their control over territory,46 it is a central tenet of interna-
tional law that such control is complete, and this necessarily includes all prop-
erty: real, personal, tangible, and intangible. Thus, international law recognizes
that all states may exercise general police powers, as well as the power of emi-
nent domain. Both powers are predicated on the state's role as guardian and rep-
resentative of its nationals' welfare. The police power permits states to pass civil
and criminal laws to govern the conduct of its citizens, and to define its form of
government. The power of eminent domain refers to the state's ultimate author-
ity to acquire use and/or possession of property within its territory for the public
good.47 In both liberal and socialist traditions, the state retains broad power to
abrogate property rights for the promotion of public purposes.
48
44. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (noting that "[plroperty guards
the troubled boundary between individual man and the state").
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 206(a).
46. TRIMBLE & CARTER, sUpra note ],at 462.
47. See G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), U.N. GAOR Secretariat Centre for Human Rights § 4 (1962),
available at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/ natres.htm [hereinafter Res. 18031; see also Jon
A. Stanley, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory Takings as Defined in International
Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 349, 372
(2001).
48. Res. 1803,supra note 47, §4;see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 443; Hawaii Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding a state law that gives the state the authority to take the
fee simple title to realty from owner-lessors and transfer it to lessees in order to reduce the concen-
tration of fee simple ownership).
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But defining the contours of the property rights retained by an individual, as
against the state, is difficult, especially in a globalized economy. In modern lib-
eral thought, property is a monolithic type, and an end in and of itself.49 It is a
"natural right," of equal importance to other fundamental civil rights and de-
serving of an equivalent level of protection.5" In order to protect the individual
from government oppression, property must be protected from invasion, and
imbued with legal stability and strong expectations of security. In socialist
thought, property is a means to an end, subsumed by the purposes of shoring up
social/economic/cultural rights. In order to protect the people from inequitable
distribution of wealth and alienation of labor, property must be easily subject to
control by the state, and not allowed to accrue in one class (capitalists) to the det-
riment of others (workers). 51
The importance of this divergence in property theories can be understood by
examining the law of expropriation. Expropriation occurs when a state takes pos-
session of formerly private property for public purposes. The unsettled nature of
the law in this area highlights the depth of division and lack of clarity regarding
the role of property rights in international law. While the power of eminent do-
main is effectively absolute, it receives legitimacy from the implicit understanding
that the people subject themselves to it (as they subject themselves to the sover-
eign) for the greater public good. Thus a state may expropriate private property
only when it is necessary, and in a good faith effort to promote the general wel-
fare.52 Even with that limitation, international courts and tribunals have consis-
tently upheld a state's broad discretion in defining the extent of their eminent
domain powers.53 Several decisions have required a balancing of the public inter-
est and the private property right, but this balancing invariably comes out in favor
of permitting the government to exercise its broad police powers.54
Beyond this functional agreement regarding the appropriateness of, or def-
erence to, expropriation, three important issues remain unresolved. The first
relates to the extent of a state's obligation to compensate nationals and aliens for
49. Pefialver, supra note 8, at 188.
50. Id.
51. See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Proletarians and Comminists, from the Communist Mani-
festo, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW: CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 219
(Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).
52. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 509 (2d ed. 1993).
53. Stanley, supra note 47, at 372, 374.
54. Id. at 372.
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the direct deprivation of property (expropriation).5 The second relates to the
determination of when a state's exercise of its regulatory power creates such a
significant deprivation of property as to amount to expropriation, and thus
require compensation. 6 The third, and perhaps most important issue, is defin-
ing property for purposes of protection by international law.57 The ultimate
answers to these questions will have an enormous impact on the achievement of
social/economic/cultural rights, and the future of sovereignty, because they go to
the very heart of government's ability to structure the material relationships
upon which all people depend.
There is no consensus on how much compensation is due to a property
holder whose property is expropriated, but three rules are vying for domi-
nance.58 The first is the "national treatment" standard, which holds that interna-
tional law requires only that an expropriating country compensate aliens to the
same extent that it compensates nationals.59 The national treatment standard has
been overwhelmingly endorsed by U.N. Resolutions. For example, the standard
was endorsed in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS)
by a vote of 120-6-10, with the abstentions and no votes coming from industri-
alized countries (including the United States and Western Europe).6' The sec-
ond standard, long followed and still endorsed by the United States and other
capital-exporting countries, is the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard.61
This rule emerged from the practice of colonial empires, and essentially requires
states to pay the market value of the expropriated property.62 The third rule is
the "partial compensation" standard. This standard holds that certain types of
expropriations (such as taking land for a highway) require compensation, while
others (such as systematic land reform) do not, and that, in the latter cases, states
may provide less than full (market value) compensation.63
55. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw,supra note 9, at 321.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Pefialver, supra note 8, at 140-48.
59. Id. at 143-47.
60. Id. at 146.
61. Id. at 140-43.
62. This is similar to the standard adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U.S. 282, 285 (1893) (holding that for purposes of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, "just compensation" means market value).
63. See Pefialver, supra note 8, at 147-48.
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The question of when a government action or regulation that diminishes
the value of private property requires compensation is increasingly important.
This is an area where a radically conservative idea, influential in the United
States, is having an impact on international law. In U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the idea is referred to as a "regulatory taking."' In international
law, the same idea, as it applies to the property of foreign nationals, is called "in-
direct expropriation. ' 65 Because the United States is one of the leading capital-
exporting states, U.S. law has had a strong influence on the development of
international law regarding investment, trade, and indirect expropriation. 66
This question essentially broadens the inquiry into when a taking has occurred
by expanding the number of state actions that may trigger a right to compensa-
tion. While indirect expropriation exists in theory, the vast majority of such
claims by alien claimants are denied:67 the government must physically take pos-
session of property in order for a taking to be compensable. This follows logi-
cally from the great deference that international tribunals have afforded to states
in applying their police powers. 68
However, in the United States regulatory takings constitute a real cause of
action, and a recent decision by the Supreme Court has arguably expanded the
scope of such claims. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,69 the Court held
that a taking occurs when a regulation deprives the property holder of any "eco-
nomically beneficial uses" of his property, unless the regulation prohibits a use
that is already impermissible under nuisance law.7 °
Emboldened by emerging U.S. property rights theory, and frustrated by the
unresponsiveness of international law to ensure compensation, state parties to
trade agreements have included provisions that model, and even exceed, the
protection of U.S. Supreme Court takings jurisprudence by giving companies an
64. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 502-09.
65. See id. at 466.
66. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 39;see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 501 (describing the strong in-
fluence of the United States on indirect expropriation).
67. See Stanley, supra note 47, at 372.
68. See id.
69. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
70. Id. at 1023, 1027. But see generally James M. McElfish Jr., Property Rights, Property Roots: Re-
discovering the Basis for Legal Protection of the Environment, 24 ELR 10231 (1994) (arguing that
most regulatory takings claims are attempts to redefine, not preserve, the rights associated with
private property).
266
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enforceable right against participating states to compensation for direct and
indirect expropriation.7' These provisions are included in numerous bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).72
Capital-exporting countries herald these agreements as a clear indication of a
change of consensus in international law. But this conclusion is not well sup-
ported. Consistent, contrary state practice and numerous widely supported U.N.
Resolutions to the contrary indicate that the "prompt, adequate, and effective"
standard may reasonably be seen as a bargaining concession that capital-importing
countries believe is required in order to attract investment.73 Whatever the status
of "international law" in this area, these provisions establish radically new and
dangerous limits on the ability of states to regulate in order to protect public wel-
fare. It is clear that market globalization is promoting, if not founded upon, the
idea that private property is more fundamental than the power of the state to ar-
range the distribution of resources to meet human needs.
74
II. GLOBAL PROBLEMS
The emerging dominance of liberal/market property theory is problematic
for several reasons. First, it views private ownership as an unmitigated good.75
This leads adherents to embrace robust property rights without skepticism. 7
6
Second, it increasingly rejects limits on property rights derived from social
needs,77 thereby making it harder for states to change property distributions to
adapt to changing circumstances. Third, these theories treat property as its own
end, divorced from any animating purpose or value.78 In the extreme, this per-
mits a calculus whereby other values, even including human life, can be sacri-
ficed to protect private property rights. Fourth, liberal property theory harbors
"excessive faith in market mechanisms as the means of distributing the goods of
71. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 472-86.
72. See id.
73. See Pefialver, supra note 8, at 152.
74. See id. at 142.
75. See id. at 186-87.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 187.
78. Id. at 188.
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society."'79 As a result, "[d]isembedded global markets make societies conform to
the logic of commercialization.""0 This elevation of rights in speculative prop-
erty has led to three major crises in human rights, namely, the demotion of
social, economic, and cultural rights, the weakening of the state's ability to pro-
tect public welfare, and the distortion of civil/political rights.
A. Demotion of Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights
The bending of property rights to benefit commercial interests overvalues
development and speculation at the expense of basic human needs and human
rights. Government condemnation of communities, influenced and supported
by Western investment, allows developers, road builders, mining companies,
and international financiers to take private property for development and dis-
place millions of people each year. 8" This results in widespread poverty, loss of
homes, schools, health care, and livelihoods, as well as social and cultural disori-
entation,8 2 in direct contravention of the guarantees contained in the ICESR. s3
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the standard market-value com-
pensation (where it is actually paid) is not sufficient to account and compensate
for all of the loss and suffering that displaced people endure. For example, in
1999, the World Bank approved a $160 million loan to China, which China plans
to use to displace 58,000 poor farmers from their homes and land, and to relocate
them to a sparsely populated part of Tibet in order to exert political control in
the region and supply labor for a planned oil pipeline. 4 As Robert Latham
points out, "there is every reason to believe that, in the face of the global forces
described above, things will be getting worse."85
79. Id. at 195.
80. Robert Latham, Globalization and the Transformation of Economic Rights, in GLOBALIZATION
AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE 76, 78 (Barry K. Gills ed., 2000)
81. See International Network on Displacement and Resettlement, at http://www.
displacement.net.
82. See Theodore E. Downing, Mitigating Social Impoverishment When People Are Involuntarily
Displaced, at http://www.ted-downing.com/papers/didi 1.htm [hereinafter Downing]
83. See ICESCR, supra note 11, arts. 6, 10, 11, 15.
84. See HILARY FRENCH, VANISHING BORDERS: PROTECTING THE PLANET IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL-
IZATION 135 (2000).
85. Latham, supra note 80, at 85.
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B. Demotion of Public Welfare
Trade agreements that expansively define expropriation-and subject states
to direct suit from corporations and individuals-threaten to have a chilling
effect on the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest by giving
companies the right to base claims for compensation on the economic impact
(much of it prospective) of environmental and other public health regulations.8 6
In one example, Ethyl Corporation, a U.S. company with a wholly owned sub-
sidiary in Canada, sued the Canadian government for $250 million for indirect
expropriation under NAFTA Article 1 110. Canada had enacted legislation that
made it a crime to import or trade manganese-based substances between prov-
inces due to public health concerns about adverse neurological effects similar to
mild Parkinson's disease.87 Ethyl Corporation's complaint alleged that the Cana-
dian government could not scientifically support its allegations of risk, and was
in fact simply protecting domestic producers of the substances. Due to internal
pressure from several provincial governments, Canada settled the case for
thirteen million dollars.
C. Distortion of Civil/Political Rights
In addition to disadvantaging social/economic/cultural rights and con-
straining the ability of states to protect the public, the ascendance of liberal prop-
erty rights also departs from its own philosophical roots to undermine the
promise of civil/political rights, including equal opportunity, democracy, and
self-determination. Lockean theory posits an important limit to these rights.
Locke argued that the right of appropriation of resources from nature existed
only so long as there is "enough and as good left in common for others."88 But
global capitalism seems to have forgotten this caveat. For example, the income of
the world's richest one percent equals that of the poorest fifty-seven percent,
while nearly one-fourth of the world's population lives on less than one dollar
per day.89 More than 840 million people in the world are malnourished, and six
86. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 467.
87. See id. at 49 0-91.
88. Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28
STAN. L. REV. 877, 888 (1976).
89. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOC-
RACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD (2002), available at http'//www.undp.org/hdr2002/.
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million children under the age of five die every year as a result of hunger.9" As
John Rawls argues, in a world characterized by excessive inequality of wealth,
equal opportunity is put at risk "and political liberty likewise tends to lose its
value, and representative government to become such in appearance only.""
And as Thomas C. Grey notes, "a necessitous man is not a free man."92 In condi-
tions of poverty and severe need, the poor cannot enter into transactions for
housing, employment, and other basic needs freely and voluntarily,93 thus
undermining the liberal ideals of individual autonomy and dignity.94
III. PROPERTY WITH PURPOSE
There is a great irony about property: the increasing financial value of prop-
erty, as a market concept, is inversely proportional to its normative moral value,
as a legal concept. That is to say, as a particular article of property becomes more
alienable, it becomes easier to trade, yet loses its particular relationship to human
needs and rights. The evidence for this fact comes, in one extreme example,
from the international consensus that a person's body is inalienable. 95 As Locke
notes, "every Man has a Property in his own Person."96 Thus, if we imagine such
property as protecting a person's human needs and rights, including life, bodily
integrity, dignity, and autonomy, we can see that allowing human beings to be
sold (allowing the property rights to be transferred to another) severs the con-
nection between the object and its human context.97
Not so ironic is the observation that as property becomes more aligned with
negative rights, it precludes the realization of positive rights. As stated earlier,
social, economic, and cultural rights, considered by some to be the "'stepchild' of
the human rights movement," '98 are perhaps better understood as the orphan of
90. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY
IN THE WORLD 2002 (2002), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7352e/y7352eOO.htm.
91. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 278 (1971).
92. Grey, supra note 88, at 893.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 893-94.
95. UDHR,supra note 11, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 8.
96. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 965 (1982) (quoting
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V, § 27 (1952) (6th ed. 1764)).
97. Id. at 966.
98. See Pefialver, supra note 8, at 139 (citing HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 337, 361 (4th ed. 1994)).
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the human rights movement. They have been orphaned because property, upon
which they rely, has abandoned its social purpose.
Therefore, in order to reconcile civil and political rights with social, eco-
nomic, and cultural rights, we must reconcile financial value with moral value
and negative rights with positive rights. Only then can we create a common
space in which these opposing world-views can cooperate, and in which we can
realize the best that each has to offer. Only in this way can we bring social, eco-
nomic, and cultural rights the attention and protection that they require.
To begin, we must articulate our shared values about property rights, and
the role that property plays in relation to other human rights. We must, as
Robert Latham says, "reinject social purpose into economic life." 9 Many authors
have attempted this project. I will describe just three efforts that I believe are
most helpful in framing the issues and offering suggestions. I will then offer my
own comments on these suggestions, and recommend a framework for imple-
menting value-driven global property rights.
A. Provisionism
Robert Latham, drawing on the writings of Karl Polanyi, offers an impor-
tant reminder that I will take as a starting point in exploring the purpose of
property. The activity that is basic to all societies is the "provision of the means
of existence."'00 Polanyi, writing in 1944, showed how the organization of mate-
rial life around markets overlooked the possibility that market systems would
"form their own logic, laws, and interests separate from the rest of society," de-
taching from, and ignoring, "the more basic social purpose of supplying all of
humankind ... 'with the means of material want-satisfaction.""0' Latham goes
on to say that "[p]rovisionism begins from the basic proposition that the purpose
of institutions and activities that shape material life is to provide communities
with goods, services, and other values necessary to sustain community or group
life, free of deprivation."'
102
99. Latham, supra note 80, at 84.
100. Id. at 82.
101. See id. (citing KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1944)).
102. Id. at 83.
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Latham's view can properly be regarded as globalist, yet he writes from
within the movement to resist the dislocation and social insecurity that attend
globalization. He is skeptical about the potential for sovereign states to resist the
destabilizing effects of"disembedded" markets for several reasons. First, there is
an assumption that help for the developing states will come from the wealthier
developed nations-a hope that history does not bear out. Second, state and na-
tional elites may be unduly influenced by corporations. Finally, it is difficult to
see how local forces, with limited authority, can take on detached global market
networks.' 3 Ultimately, however, Latham concludes that provisionism must be
informed by the local, and can "provide a normative basis to contest and disci-
pline state policies as well as market outcomes."'" Latham envisions "new forms
of collaborative regulations between states and societies at the global level."'0 5
B. Personhood Property
In her landmark article, "Property and Personhood," Margaret Radin dis-
cerns in American property law a person-centered value system that she claims
consistently affects outcomes in property decisions, yet remains unexplored.0 6
Her "intuitive" view of property is that the amount of protection afforded prop-
erty in a particular dispute depends (as it should) on the extent to which we con-
stitute ourselves as persons through our possession and/or interaction with an
object.' °7 For example, a wedding ring, a portrait, or a house would be consid-
ered personal (constitutive) property because the owner is bound up with it in a
way that is unique to the person, and the pain of losing the object cannot be re-
lieved by a replacement. os Conversely, property that is not personal is fungible:
its loss does not engender pain and it can be replaced.
Though framed as a dichotomy (constitutive versus fungible), Radin con-
ceives of her metaphor as a continuum.0 9 Where property resides along that
spectrum determines the level of protection to which it is entitled. Thus, the
103. See id. at 80-81.
104. Id. at 85.
105. Id. at 86.
106. Radin,supra note 96.
107. Id. at 960.
108. See id. at 959.
109. Id. at 986.
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more closely an object is connected with personhood, the stronger the entitle-
ment. For example, when a person lives in the house she owns, the house is
closer to the personal end of the spectrum than when she owns a house, but rents
it to others.
Radin illustrates her theory with a number of examples from positive law.
In the first category, she illustrates the importance of home. For example, she at-
tributes the Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia,'1° in which a state
law prohibiting the possession of obscenity in the home was ruled unconstitu-
tional, to more than just protection of the right to privacy. Looking at it in terms
of personhood considerations, she concludes that the Court was influenced by
our society's sense of connection between one's home and one's sense of auton-
omy and personhood. She also views certain landlord/tenant statutes as being in-
fluenced by personhood considerations, arguing, "[t]he notion that the law
should grant permanent tenure to tenants during good behavior, regardless of
what the lease contract says about the term, is a more direct instance of the per-
sonhood perspective applied to residential tenancies."'II
Regarding takings, Radin asserts that some personhood property may be so
personal that compensation would not be adequate, and thus should not be sub-
ject to taking because doing so would cause the person to cease to be "herself."
This would amount to a strict scrutiny-type test, whereas the taking of fungible
property does not compromise personhood and can be compensated effectively
with money.
Radin also creates a separate category of cases that she frames as fungible
property interests versus personal non-property interests."2 For example, per-
sonhood theory might explain why health care workers, union organizers, or
protestors should be allowed on (fungible) business property such as a farm, a
factory, or a mall, by viewing the dispute as one between the property owner's
fungible interest in the property and the non-owner's personhood interest in
health care, employment security, or speech. Radin suggests that this analysis
would require a balancing test between the two interests. 1"3
110. Id. at 991.
I11. Id. at 994.
112. Id. at 1008.
113. Id. at 1009.
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C. Property for Dignity
In "Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the
Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution," Eduardo Moiss Pefialver sets out
to establish an "ethically-grounded theory of international law and human
rights""' 4 and to link human rights and property law. The central premise is that
property deserves protection to the extent that it promotes human dignity, that
there exists in natural law a minimum standard for the treatment of property
consistent with human dignity, and that redistribution of property can be justi-
fied when one person's dignity need is greater than that of another."5
As his starting point, Pefialver takes the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights statement that human rights derive from "inherent human dignity," and
explores two possible sources for these rights. Looking first to classical interna-
tional law, Pefialver describes it as unable normatively to support such an expan-
sive idea of human rights for three reasons. First, classical international law is
concerned with the nation-state, to the point of overlooking the rights of indi-
viduals. Second, to the extent that classical international law does cognize indi-
viduals, it does so only with regard to nationals of another state."6 Third, the
positivist preference of classical international law leaves it impotent in the face of
conflicting or ambiguous sources. 17
Pefialver then turns his analysis to natural law, and adopts as his primary
source St. Thomas Aquinas's Social Theory of Property."8 Aquinas's theory was
based on necessity, whereby a person in need did not violate the law by taking
property from others in order to meet his minimum needs." 9 Pefialver goes on to
articulate his own three-tiered hierarchy of human dignity. He begins with a
definition of dignity that is very similar to Margaret Radin's definition of per-
sonal property. Dignity is "the property a thing has when it has intrinsic value,
when it is, literally, price-less."'2 °
Next, Pefialver describes three levels of human dignity that require protec-
tion through private property. The first level is "physical dignity," which
114. Pefialver, supra note 8, at 155.
115. See id. at 200.
116. Id. at 110.
117. Seei. at 111.
118. Id. at 190.
119. See id. at 192.
120. See id. at 196.
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includes basic survival needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. The second level
is "developmental dignity," which includes the resources for the training and
education needed to be able to form intelligent conclusions about the human
telos. Examples of developmental dignity include family, which Pefialver says
requires "[a] material sphere of property ... to protect the family from intru-
sion."'' The third level is "expressive dignity" and involves the property neces-
sary to act on moral and intellectual conclusions. Expressive dignity includes
education of one's children, religious worship, political participation, work,
friendship, liberality, and charity.'22 Pefialver asserts that the right to own prop-
erty implies a positive right to both physical dignity property and developmental
dignity property, but only a negative right to expressive dignity.'23 He also asserts
that organizations can have expressive property rights to the extent that they
come together for worship, political expression, or collective work.'24 Finally,
Pefialver says that these levels of property establish the minimum level of protec-
tion, which can be supplemented by international custom. Beyond this mini-
mum, states retain an "undeniable right of sovereignty" to provide greater
protections based on their own values and needs.'25
IV. RECONCILING HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGNTY
As the world becomes smaller, and the welfare of people around the globe
becomes dependent on how others define and apply property protections, the
need for global property law becomes more compelling. Not only do we need
global property law for its own sake, but the ultimate success of human rights,
and the future of local governance, may depend on it. If we look again at the
types of human rights in dispute in international law, we see that many of the so-
called positive rights in the ICESCR appear as negative rights in U.S. constitu-
tional law. Many scholars have even noted that there is significant overlap be-
tween the two.'26 I hope to show that injecting a negative rights regime with
human rights priorities is an achievable evolution of current law, and will go a
long way toward securing social, economic, and cultural rights as well as a
121. Id. at 197.
122. See id. at 198.
123. Id. at 200.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 207.
126. See, e.g., Eide & Rosas, supra note 16, at 16-17.
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permanent role for sovereign states in promoting public welfare through em-
bedded governance. I take as my starting point the insights of Latham, Radin,
and Pefialver described above. I will then demonstrate how these theories, taken
together, might inform a global property framework, and will offer suggestions
regarding five dynamics of such a system: a hierarchy of property rights, the dis-
tinction between negative and positive rights, judicial review of property dis-
putes, compensation, and the role of sovereignty.
A. Hierarchy of Property Rights
As Latham reminds us, property's purpose is provision of material needs.'27
While this is an essential reminder, and a useful starting point, it does not pro-
vide us with the theoretical ability to distinguish the relative importance of dif-
ferent types of property, and thus leaves us with the question of how to
prioritize. Radin goes further by dividing property into two types, and demon-
strating how courts and legislators have acted upon, if not articulated, an under-
standing of the relative importance of different types of property. 28 Developing
a strain that we see in Latham's writings, Radin identifies some property as spec-
ulative and disembedded, and thus deserving less protection than personal and
imbedded property. 29 However, Radin's theory lacks the tools for distinguishing
between property with which people sustain themselves, and property through
which people constitute themselves. Also, because Radin's theory is ultimately
based on a person's subjective attachment to property, it fails to offer a way to
distinguish between similar instances of personhood property that are economi-
cally disparate. It would seem, therefore, that a millionaire's mansion would be
entitled to the same property protection as a hovel. Since one of the major prob-
lems with property today is the concentration of wealth, Radin's theory is inad-
equate for my purposes because it fails to support a redistributive mandate.3 ° Of
the three authors, Pefialver's hierarchy comes closest to what I would recom-
mend. My main disagreement with his model is that he fails to create a category
for property that is completely disembedded, and thus least deserving of protec-
tion. Pefialver's third category, expressive dignity, comes close, but lumps
127. Latham, supra note 80, at 82.
128. Radin,supra note 96, at 957.
129. Id. at 959-60.
130. Id. at 989, 996.
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religious worship, political participation, and work together with disembedded,
speculative property, thereby confusing an essential distinction, diminishing the
value of the former, and enhancing the value of the latter.
I would recommend a different three-tiered hierarchy. The highest level,
which I would call "Needs Property," would include those rights which are
beyond dispute in international law (e.g. food, shelter, health care, education,
and employment). The middle level, which I would call "Rights Property,"
would include all other rights for which there is significant, but perhaps not uni-
versal, support, including various civil/political rights, and social/economic/
cultural rights (e.g.. privacy, expression, religion, marriage, family, child rearing,
and association). Beyond the rights acknowledged in common, states would be
free to include additional Rights Property in this class. The final level, which I
would call Wealth Property, would include property that generates, and/or is
generated by, wealth accumulation (e.g. investments, methods of production).
The distinctions between these categories would be objective, and based on the
use to which the property is put. For example, my home is Needs Property,
whereas the apartment building that I own and rent out is Wealth Property. To
the extent that two instances of Needs Property can be vastly different in value
(the hovel versus the mansion), the legislature should articulate a reasonable
limit to the value that will be protected.
B. Negative Versus Positive Rights
Both Latham and Pefialver argue that individuals have an affirmative right
to Needs Property, and Pefialver adds that individuals have a negative right to
the lower-level rights.'3' Radin's theory employs only negative rights, and de-
scribes the relative weight of the negative rights that guard different types of
property.' I would follow Radin in expressing property rights only as negative,
but valued against each other according to their place in the hierarchy. This is
preferable to Pefialver's combination of positive and negative rights for several
reasons. First, the concept of negative rights already has broad support, espe-
cially among capital-exporting countries (who would be most disadvantaged by,
and therefore most resistant to, the rearrangement of priorities I suggest).
131. Latham,supra note 80, at 83; Pefialver, supra note 8, at 199-200.
132. See generally Radin,supra note 96.
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Second, it is easier to administer and adjudicate claims of negative rights. A
mixed positive/negative regime could create situations of theft leading to class
warfare on one extreme, and to hair-splitting distinctions to determine who is
the neediest, on the other. Third, strong negative rights will have a redistributive
effect, as will become clearer with the following discussions of standards of
review and compensation.
C. Judicial Review
In order for a property hierarchy to have meaning in operation, it must be
enforceable. As such, it requires a standard of judicial review for scrutinizing
state action and balancing the relative rights of individuals. Of the three authors,
only Radin offers a discussion of the appropriate level of judicial review.
Though this approach has not been adopted by any jurisdiction, Radin suggests
that government takings of personhood property should be subject to strict
scrutiny.'33 Consistent with this, I would assign increasingly strict levels of judi-
cial review to the levels of the hierarchy.
Thus, for example, attempts by the state to take Needs Property (for in-
stance, a home) will have to meet a compelling state interest, and must be neces-
sary to accomplish that interest. Attempts to take Rights Property (such as a
church) will have to meet an intermediate test under which there must be a sub-
stantial government interest, and the action must be narrowly tailored to accom-
plish that interest. Finally, takings of Wealth Property (a business) would
remain subject to a very deferential rational basis test, under which there need
only be a legitimate public purpose and the action need only be rationally related
to the purpose.
This hierarchy of review could also inform a balancing test to be applied in
disputes between private individuals. For example, a racially restrictive covenant
would be struck down because the Needs Property interest (housing) outweighs
the Rights Property interest (freedom of association). Protestors would be allowed
to demonstrate at a mall because the Rights Property interest (speech) outweighs
the Wealth Property interest (mall ownership). Finally, limits on a landlord's free
alienation of his rental property, such as rent control, would be understood as
Needs Property (housing) outweighing Wealth Property (rental income).
133. Id. at 1005-06.
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D. Compensation
The final application of the new property framework would be to the ques-
tion of compensation for takings. Radin's contribution to this question is in her
suggestion that some property is so personal that its loss cannot be compensated,
and thus the state should be prohibited from taking it.'34 Also, as noted earlier,
market-value compensation is often insufficient to compensate for all of the loss
and suffering that occurs when people are displaced.'35
I would create a compensation scale that corresponds to the property hierar-
chy. Such a scale would reinforce the relative values in the hierarchy by increas-
ing the cost of taking Needs Property and Rights Property, and would, as a
result, make them more stable. For Needs Property, compensation should be
three times the market value, to help account for the "brutal" nature of being de-
prived of Needs Property, and to attempt to compensate for the immeasurable
consequences of social, economic, and cultural dislocation. For Rights Property,
compensation should be twice the market value, for similar reasons. And for
Wealth Property, compensation should follow the standard American approach
of paying market value. While this multiplier approach may sometimes fail to
accurately compensate for a person's loss, fairness and ease of administration
argue for adopting a simple and consistent standard.
E. The Role of Sovereignty
The final consideration for implementing a global property framework is
the role to be played by sovereign states. As discussed earlier, due to the pro-
found western bias and the power of global economic interests, Latham is suspi-
cious of the state's ability to resist globalization and believes that in the era of
globalization, "powerful boundaries-ideological or otherwise-[must] be
placed around the action and capacities of states to interfere" with the making of
market networks.'36 At the same time, Latham is aware of the need to create lo-
cal, embedded economies that conform to the needs of societies.3 7 Pefialver re-
minds us that because needs and norms vary greatly among states, the state has
134. Id. at 1005.
135. See generally Downing, supra note 82.
136. Latham,supra note 80, at 80.
137. Id. at 78.
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an essential role to play in giving meaning to a human-rights centered property
regime,' 38 and recommends that states retain virtual plenary power to determine
the specific content of their property regimes consistent with the minimum stan-
dards required by human rights.'
3 9
In order to reconcile these concerns, and fortify the important democratic
role of sovereign states, I would conceive of the new property framework as op-
erating in a federalist structure similar to that articulated by Daniel J. Elazar 4 °
Elazar suggests that states "remain the primary building blocks of the world
order," while closely resembling the states in a federal arrangement: "with
clearly defined territories, comprehensive governmental structures, and impor-
tant functional responsibilities," but "parts of larger political arrangements and
networks that both limit them and provide their people with new opportunities
and essentially redefine their powers as jurisdictional rather than sovereign.' ' 4'
Thus, states would retain their relevance and role as protectors of local public
welfare, while conforming to global mandates to protect and promote the full
promise of human rights.
CONCLUSION
Globalization is transforming the world's concepts of human rights and sov-
ereignty. Despite substantial agreement, there remain great divergence and in-
creasing inequity in these areas. These disagreements are caused in large part by
differences in conceptions of the relative rights and power of individuals and
states, and the role that property plays in that power dynamic. Within this dis-
agreement, however, are the seeds of consensus, calling for a solution. By focus-
ing on this agreement, we can create a set of property values that promotes
economic, social, and cultural rights and shores up the role of the state in the glo-
bal era. The framework suggested by this note strikes a middle ground between
liberalism and socialism. It would infuse the property protections of liberalism
with the redistributive ethic of socialism by correlating protection with social
value, and thus give property that promotes higher values greater stability and
138. Pefialver, supra note 8, at 201-02.
139. Id. at 202.
140. Daniel J. Elazar, The State System + Globalization (Economic Plus Human Rights) = Federal-
ism (State Federations Plus Regional Confederations), 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 555 (1999).
141. Id. at 556.
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protection, while leaving the state free to regulate lower-value property for the
public good. From the perspective of socialism, it stops the runaway sanctifica-
tion of capitalist property rights by circumscribing the protection of speculative
property. From the perspective of liberalism, it strengthens the fundamental
rights and security of individuals as against the majority by increasing the expec-
tation for protection of "rights-promoting" property. Finally, it depends on, and
reinforces, the essential role of sovereign states in the era of globalization.
Within this framework, the global community can agree on increased respect
for, and commitment to, providing for human needs and protecting human
rights.

